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RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE-PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS-NOT ADMISSIBLE AS
SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE, LIMITED IN IMPEACHMENT OF OWN WIT-
NESS. Commonwealth v. Gee, __ Pa. -, 354 A.2d 875 (1976).
In Commonwealth v. Gee, ' a plurality decision, 2 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reaffirmed its traditional views3 on the use of prior
inconsistent statements and impeachment of a party's own witness.
Unswayed by the pronouncement of Justice Roberts that the case presented
a good example (1) why we should abandon the ancient doctrine
that the party producing a witness vouches for his truthfulness
and (2) why we should admit the prior inconsistent statements of
witnesses as evidence concerning the matters contained in the
statement 4
the court affirmed a conviction of second degree murder. Adhering to
established Pennsylvania law on both issues, the court declined to examine
the merits of Justice Robert's contentions despite their support by numer-
ous authorities5 and embodiment in the Federal Rules of Evidence 6 and
other codes.
7
Appellant, Gregory Gee, had been found guilty of second degree
1. - Pa. -, 354 A.2d 875 (1976).
2. The opinion in this case does not represent a clearcut majority-minority situation.
The "majority" (plurality) opinion represents the views of two justices. Two other justices
concurred only in the result. Two justices dissented, and the other justice, Jones, took no part
in the decision of the case.
3. See notes 12-13, 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
4. - Pa. at -, 354 A.2d at 884.
5. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, THE LAWOF EVIDENCE § 36 at 71-72, § 38 at 77-78, § 39at
78, § 47 at 97-100, § 251 at 601-04 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; E. MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE, 67-70 (1963); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 899 at 663-66, § 907
at 694-97, § 1018 at 995-1007 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Ladd,
Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239 (1967).
6. Federal Rule of Evidence 607 provides that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be
attacked by any party, including the party calling him." Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)
states that a statement is not hearsay if
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony,
and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive ...
7. The Uniform Rules of Evidence have been changed to conform with the Federal
Rules of Evidence. In the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 63(l) would have admitted
any statement of a person present at trial and subject to cross-examination. Rule 20 would
allow impeachment of a party's own witness. Model Code of Evidence rule 503 would admit
any statement if the declarant is present and subject to cross-examination.
murder for a stabbing during hostilities between two rival gangs. At trial
the Commonwealth called only one eyewitness, informing the defense that
others who had given statements to the police would not be called because
they had changed aspects of their stories and were not considered to be
reliable. Despite the apparent eagerness of these witnesses to testify against
Gee, the defense decided to call them on its own behalf, disregarding the
trial judge's repeated admonitions that if the witnesses testified adversely
the defense could not claim surprise and impeach them with prior inconsist-
ent statements. When the witnesses failed to give the desired testimony,
all defense efforts to impeach them were prohibited by the court. The
supreme court found no ground for reversal in the trial court's action. 8
The significance of this decision is not in its holding9 that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by preventing the defendant from
impeaching his own witnesses with prior inconsistent statements,' 0 but in
its presentation of a forum for confrontation between established Pennsyl-
vania law, which limits the use of prior inconsistent statements, and a
growing body of modern authority, which urges that such limitations be
abandoned as serious obstructions to the ascertainment of truth.
A court's decision to admit or exclude prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence can be determinative of the outcome of a case. When
the use of such statements is limited to discrediting the testimony of a
witness, they cannot satisfy a burden of proof. Moreover, on that basis, a
directed verdict may be appropriate."I
Pennsylvania accords with the majority of jurisdictions 2 in refusing
to admit prior inconsistent statements of non-party witnesses as substantive
evidence of the truth of matters asserted. '3 This rule exists in most states, 14
although some have altered it by decision 15 or as part of an evidence code. 16
8. - Pa. at -, 354 A.2d at 883.
9. The court also made findings concerning the duties of the prosecution with respect
to exculpatory evidence, the rights of a defendant to the prosecution's tests, interview sheets
and statements of witnesses, and the inadmissibility of polygraph examinations.
10. The supreme court found no denial of due process resulting from the trial court's
decision that such important considerations as preventing delay and confusion, which could
have been caused by additional testimony, outweighed the need for the testimony.
11. Comment, Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Rule Against Impeachment of
One's Own Witness: Proposed Federal Rules, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1383 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as 52 TEXAS L. REV.].
12. E.g., State v. Volpe, 113 Conn. 288, 155 A. 223 (1931); Chapman v. State, 302 So. 2d
136 (Fla. App. 1974); People v. Gant, 58 II!. 2d 178, 317 N.E.2d 564 (1974); Capital Raceway
Promotions, Inc. v. Smith, 22 Md. App. 224, 322 A.2d 238 (1974); Durbin v. K-K-M Corp., 54
Mich. App. 38, 220 N.W.2d 110 (1974); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 307 A.2d 245
(1973).
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532,260 A.2d 773 (1970); Wilson
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 421 Pa. 419,219 A.2d 666 (1966); Goodis v. Gimbel Bros., 420 Pa.
439, 218 A.2d 574 (1966); Kunkel v. Vogt, 354 Pa. 279, 47 A.2d 195 (1946).
14. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 251, at 601-02; Beaver & Biggs, Attending Witnesses'
Prior Declarations as Evidence, 3 IND. L.F. 309, 325 (1970).
15. Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1971); State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135, 515
P.2d 880 (1973); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d
291 (N.D. 1973); Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969).
16. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1); CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1235 (West 1966); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-460(a) (1964); N.J.R. EVID. 63(1); UTAH R. EVID. 63(1).
Despite their recognition of strong criticism of the traditional rule and
its abandonment in the Federal Rules of Evidence,' 7 the Gee plurality
supplied no rationale for retaining it. The dissent was more articulate,
focusing upon two of the three primary grounds typically advanced for its
abrogation.
First, the rule originated as a justification for admitting witnesses'
prior statements over a hearsay objection. 18 The hearsay argument noted
that the prior statements were not made under oath and that there was no
opportunity for cross-examination or observation of the demeanor of the
declarant. 19 Courts held, however, that the statement is admissible to
discredit a witness as long as it is not used to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. 20 The Gee dissent reiterated the classic criticisms of this reason-
ing: because the declarant is present in court for examination and cross-
examination, the common hearsay dangers are not present. 21 Yet con-
troversy remains concerning the value of cross-examination that is neither
contemporaneous with the statement nor conducted before a trier of fact.22
Supporters of the orthodox view argue that the principal virtue of cross-
examination lies in its immediate application and that its effectiveness is
lost unless it occurs when the witness makes the statement. 23 Practically
speaking, it is futile to cross-examine a witness concerning a statement if
the witness denies having made it, does not remember it, or denies its
veracity.24 Nevertheless, the dissent argued that the trier's observation of
the demeanor of a witness attempting to reconcile inconsistencies in
accounts is as valuable in evaluating the weight and credibility of the
testimony as is the observation of immediate cross-examination.
25
The dissenters' second criticism of the rule was that, although the oath
is lacking, an earlier out-of-court statement is probably more reliable than
the witness' in-court statement. 26 The statement's closer proximity to the
event would suggest that it is more accurate, having been made while
perception and memory were clearer and less likely to have been distorted
by outside influences or pressures. 27 Although the plurality did not discuss
17. - Pa. at -, 354 A.2d at 880 n.5.
18. 52 TEXAS L. REV., supra note I!, at 1386.
19. Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 361 (1974).
20. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1018, at 995.
21. - Pa. at -_, 354 A.2d at 885; accord, CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1235, Comment-
Law Revision Comm'n (West 1966); MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 39, at 78; WIGMORE, supra
note 5, § 1018, at 995.
22. Beaver & Biggs, supra note 14, at 316; Reutlinger, supra note 19, at 364-65.
23. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
24. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146(1967); Beaver& Biggs, supra note
14, at 316-17.
25. - Pa. at -, 354 A.2d at 885; accord, DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d
Cir. 1925); CAL. EvID. CODE ANN. § 1235, Comment-Law Revision Comm'n (West 1966);
Beaver & Biggs, supra note 14, at 316-17.
26. - Pa. at -, 354 A.2d at 885; accord, CAL. EvID. CODE ANN. § 1235, Comment-
Law Revision Comm'n (West 1966); Beaver & Biggs, supra note 14, at 309; Reutlinger, supra
note 19, at 361; 52 TEXAS L. REV., supra note 11, at 1386.
27. Reutlinger, supra note 19, at 368.
the rationale behind their decision, some supporters of the orthodox rule
contend that the in-court oath cannot ensure the reliability of a former
extrajudicial statement.28 The dissent's argument is also countered by
illustrating several situations in which the earlier statement would be no
more reliable than the testimony in court. For example, a witness who
made a previous statement when it was of no immediate consequence could
be affected by the solemnity of his oath. 29 Also, for every case in which the
witness was corrupted after making his first statement, there is the equal
possibility that a witness who initially lied has since been persuaded to tell
the truth. 30 Furthermore, in some cases the statement may have been made
long after the event and only a few days before the in-court statement. 3'
The accuracy of memory is the only factor that would be enhanced by
nearness in time to the event;32 falsehood, mistake or faulty perception
could be exposed only by effective cross-examination.
33
A third reason for advocating the use of prior inconsistent statements
as substantive evidence was not discussed in either the majority or
dissenting opinions in Gee. It is arguable that since the judge's instruction
to the jury that they may not consider prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence places an impossible burden on them, and hence is
rarely effective, the rule should be abandoned.34 It has been suggested,
however, that jurors' disregard of instructions is not an appropriate reason
for changing the law if it is based on valid policy.35 Moreover, the
ineffective instruction argument has no force in situations in which a judge
is the trier of fact or in which a party fails to meet its burden of proof and the
question of a jury verdict is never reached.36
Having challenged the traditional Pennsylvania rule concerning the
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, which the plurality had
accepted without question, 37 the Gee dissenters next attacked the rule
limiting the circumstances in which a party may impeach its own witness
by prior inconsistent statements. 38 Pennsylvania again follows the estab-
lished rule 39 that the party producing a witness will not be permitted to
impeach the witness' general character or to show his or her prior
28. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
29. Reutlinger, supra note 19, at 368.
30. Id,
31. Id.
32. Id. at 368-69.
33. Id.
34. United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964); Beaver & Biggs, supra note
14, at 321; Reutlinger, supra note 19, at 367; 52 TEXAS L. REV., supra note 11, at 1386.
35. 52 TEXAS L. REV., supra note ii, at 1396.
36. Reutlinger, supra note 19, at 367; 52 TEXAS L. REV., supra note i1, at 1396.
37. - Pa. at -, 354 A.2d at 880.
38. See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1971); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436
S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973).
39. See, e.g., Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925); Poitier v. State,
303 So. 2d 409 (Fla. App. 1974); Sellman v. State, 232 Md. 344, 192 A.2d 788 (1963); State v.
Tilley, 239 N.C. 245, 79 S.E.2d 473 (1954).
contradictory statements. The proponent may discredit its witness only
when surprised"' by affirmatively damaging testimony.41
The dissent recognized that elimination of the rule limiting the
substantive use of prior inconsistent statements would leave little reason to
confine the circumstances in which a party may impeach its own witness.
42
Most jurisdictions that have modified the one rule have also changed the
other. 43 The interrelation of the rules reflects one function of the limitation
on the right to impeach one's own witness: to prevent litigants from
emphasizing prior inconsistencies of their witnesses to the jury when the
statements would not be admissible as substantive evidence. 44 Neverthe-
less, several jurisdictions 45 following model codes such as the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 46 have abandoned the prohibition against impeaching
one's own witness. The majority in Gee, while noting that the federal rules
give "highly persuasive indications of the prevalent trend toward liberali-
zation in this area,' 47 remained ambivalent, neither adopting nor rejecting
them.
The original justification for the rule against impeaching one's own
witness was based on the notion that by placing a witness on the stand a
party vouches for his or her trustworthiness and can not be heard to
question it.4" Yet, a party often has little choice of witnesses, and, as the
Gee plurality recognized, a strict application of this rule can lead to
injustice .
49
Another justification advanced in support of the rule is the related idea
that a party should not be enabled to coerce favorable testimony by
threatening to attack the witness' character. 50 This policy, however, does
40. Surprise may be claimed when one's own witness becomes hostile, telling a
different story on the stand than the one he had previously told the calling party. Common-
wealth v. Delfino, 259 Pa. 272, 102 A. 949 (1918).
41. Commonwealth v. Delfino, 259 Pa. 272, 102 A. 949 (1918); 2G. HENRY, PENNSYL-
VANIA EVIDENCE § 808, at 261 (1953). The Geemajority noted that Commonwealth v. Gomino,
200 Pa. Super. 160, 188 A.2d 784 (1963), has made the "surprise" exception more flexible in
that a trial court has the discretion to allow impeachment in the absence of a strict showing of
surprise if the court deems such permission necessary to avoid injustice.
42. __ Pa. at __, 354 A.2d at 886; accord, MCCORMICK, supra note5, § 36, at 71-72, § 38
at 75-78; Ladd, supra note 5, at 250-51.
43. See, e.g., Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1971); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436
S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); State v. Igoe, 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973).
44. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 38, at 75-76; Comment, Impeaching One's Own
Witness in Missouri, 37 Mo. L. REV. 507 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 37 Mo. L. REV.]; 52
TEXAS L. REV., supra note 11, at 1398.
45. CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1235 (West 1966); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 60 (1976);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-420 (1964); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23 (1959); 20 N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-2-4 (1953); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4514 (McKinney 1963); 12 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1642 (1973);
N.J.R. EVID. 20; UTAH R. EVID. 20; Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974); State v.
Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
46. FED. R. EVID. 607; UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 20.
47. - Pa. at -, 354 A.2d at 880 n.4.
48. See, e.g., Oates v. Glover, 228 Ala. 656, 154 So. 786(1934); Thompson v. Owen, 174
I11. 229, 51 N.E. 1046 (1898); Clark v. Lansford, 191 So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1966).
49. - Pa. at-, 354 A.2d at 880; accord, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1972);
State v. Wolfe, 109 W. Va. 590, 156 S.E. 56 (1930).
50. B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 26.11, at 195-96 (6th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
not adequately justify the exclusion of prior inconsistent statements, since
they are not necessarily based on bad character. 5 ' The coercion concept
helps to explain why Pennsylvania, like many other states, has approved
the rule generally but recognizes exceptions in circumstances such as
surprise. 52 The general rule effectively prohibits impeachment by means
that attack moral character and show the witness to be unworthy of belief.53
Nevertheless, the surprise exception ensures the right of the party to show
inconsistent statements if the witness testifies in an unexpected or hostile
manner. 54
The second requirement imposed upon a party who has shown
surprise is particularly revealing of the reason for retention of the substan-
tive use limitation in jurisdictions that limit the use of prior inconsistent
statements. The proponent must show not only surprise, but also harm or
injury, rather than mere disappointment, from the witness' testimony.
55
Thus in surprise limitation jurisdictions, the impeachment of one's own
witness can be used only defensively, to neutralize harmful testimony and
to show the jury the reason for calling the witness.56 The limited nature of
the surprise exception demonstrates that the rule against impeaching one's
own witness is important as a measure to support the hearsay restrictions on
the use of prior inconsistent statements: 57 the rule operates to prevent
parties from using impeachment as a vehicle to tempt the jury to consider
the content of prior contradictory statements in their deliberations. 58
Commonwealth v. Nowalk59 acknowledged this objective of the rule in
holding that if counsel calls a witness for the purpose of bringing prior
inconsistent statements before the jury by impeachment, this device of
getting hearsay into evidence will not be allowed. The indications are clear
that these two evidentiary rules are inextricably intertwined and that they
should stand or fall together.
60
In debating the relative merits of the orthodox rules in this area and the
modern trend to jettison them, one underlying consideration remains: any
artificial barriers to the effective presentation of relevant facts must be
as JONES]; WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 899 at 663; 37 Mo. L. REV., supra note 44, at 507;
Comment, Impeachment of One's Own Witness in Tennessee, 35 TENN. L. REV. 497 (1968).
51. M. BROWN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE 279 (1949) [hereinafter cited as BROWN];
JONES, supra note 50, § 26.11, at 195-96.
52. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra. See also JONES, supra note 50, § 26.11
at 195-96.
53. Dinger v. Friedman, 279 Pa. 8, 123 A. 641 (1924); BROWN, supra note 51, at 279;
JONES, supra note 50, § 26.11, at 195-96.
54. A. JENKINS, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 17.17, at 310 (1974);
JONES, supra note 50, § 26.11, at 195-96.
55. Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957).
56. Forrester v. United States, 210 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1954); Culwell v. United States,
194 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1952); Flauhaut v. State, 66 Okla. Crim. 417, 92 P.2d 587 (1939).
57. Commonwealth v. Nowalk, 160 Pa. Super. 88, 50A.2d 115(1946);Barhamv. State,
130 Tex. Crim. 233, 93 S.W.2d 741 (1936).
58. MCCORMICK, supra note5, § 38, at 75-78; 52 TEXAS L. REV., supra note 11, at 1400;
37 Mo. L. REV., supra note 44, at 521.
59. 160 Pa. Super. 88, 50 A.2d 115 (1946).
60. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
subject to thorough examination. 6 The goal of ascertaining the truth
should take precedence over all but the most carefully considered eviden-
tiary safeguards.
In this conservative plurality opinion the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court once again reaffirmed the state's traditional unwillingness to allow
the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence or to
impeach a party's own witness. In the opinion of two of the justices,
however, the majority's decision merely perpetuates irrational boundaries
that confound the search for truth. But since the plurality declined to
address itself to the trends it noted in the Federal Rules of Evidence, these
ideas have yet to be specifically rejected, and the court may seize upon
some other opportunity to examine the need for change. For the present,
however, it is clear that Pennsylvania's time-worn rules, which substan-
tially limit the use of prior inconsistent statements, remain established law.
61. Justice Roberts closed his dissenting opinion with these words:
The majority's result serves only to keep relevant and reliable evidence from
the jury. Its result serves no greater principle than judicial inertia. I believe that a
trial is, fundamentally, a search for an objective account of the events upon which
the criminal charges are based. An evidentiary rule which forces the searcher to
ignore relevant clues whose reliability can be tested by cross-examination serves no
purpose.
- Pa. at -, 354 A.2d at 886; accord, Reutlinger, supra note 19, at 380.
[Casenote by Kathryn E. Wohlsen]
